Lidodao governance

The regular governance route begins with a Research Forum discussion that anyone can join. At least seven days must separate the initial post from the next stage, and a proposal can move forward once it has community support and the feedback has been addressed.

Snapshot Decisions

Submitting a Snapshot proposal requires at least 1,000 LDO. Someone with a smaller balance can ask DAO Ops to submit it on their behalf. That submission threshold doesn't set a minimum balance for joining the forum discussion.

Snapshot voting lasts seven days. The winning option must receive voting power representing at least 5% of total LDO supply and a simple majority of the participating voting power. A majority among participants can therefore fall short of the supply-based threshold. For a decision that requires no on-chain action, successful Snapshot approval is the final governance step.

Aragon Votes

Proposals that require on-chain action proceed to an Aragon vote on Ethereum. The five-day vote has a 72-hour main phase for Yes or No votes, followed by a 48-hour objection phase that permits No votes or changes from Yes to No.

Approval requires Yes votes representing at least 5% of total LDO supply and more than half of the participating voting power. Formal rejection requires No votes meeting both of those conditions. If neither side reaches 5% of total supply, no decision is made. Several approved Snapshot proposals may be bundled into one on-chain vote, with each item described separately.

Dual Governance protects specified permissions over Lido on Ethereum. For those covered actions, enacting an approved Aragon vote submits a proposal to Dual Governance and starts its review delay. A completed Aragon vote can therefore leave the underlying protocol change pending.

With no blocking opposition, the normal path includes a minimum three-day delay after submission before scheduling, followed by another 24 hours after scheduling before execution becomes available. Scheduling closes that proposal's Dual Governance veto window; the additional day is a separate pre-execution delay. These minimum waiting periods don't establish that an execution transaction has occurred.

Staker Opposition and Governance States

Stakers signal opposition by placing stETH, Lido's liquid staking token, its wrapped form wstETH, or unfinalized unstETH withdrawal NFTs in the signalling escrow. The veto-support calculation uses total stETH supply plus the ETH represented by finalized withdrawal NFTs in escrow as its base. wstETH and unfinalized withdrawal NFTs contribute their current stETH-equivalent amounts, while finalized withdrawal NFTs contribute their ETH claims.

Lido's Participating in Dual Governance: A Guide for stETH Holders , published October 3, 2025, describes a 1% veto-support threshold and a dynamic Veto Signalling delay of five to 45 days. The Dual Governance mechanism design makes Rage Quit conditional on support meeting the higher 10% threshold after the maximum 45-day Veto Signalling period has elapsed. Crossing 10% earlier doesn't immediately start Rage Quit.

Veto Signalling

Regular scheduling of covered proposals is blocked, while new approved proposals can still be submitted. The delay allows negotiation over cancellation or revision.

Deactivation

Both submission and regular scheduling of covered proposals are blocked during this transition out of Veto Signalling.

Veto Cooldown

Pending, non-cancelled proposals submitted before the latest entry into Veto Signalling can proceed once their minimum delay is satisfied, even if veto support remains above 1%. New proposal submission is blocked during Veto Cooldown.

Rage Quit

Regular scheduling of covered proposals remains blocked while the escrow's batch withdrawals are fulfilled and claimed and the applicable extension period runs. New approved proposals can still be submitted. The final lock on participants' ETH can continue after governance leaves this state.

Once Rage Quit starts, escrowed stETH and wstETH are irreversibly queued for exit. After withdrawal processing and claiming, ETH in the Rage Quit escrow remains subject to an additional 60-180 day timelock before final withdrawal. Ordinary withdrawals outside that escrow don't acquire this additional lock.

Opposition below the veto threshold leaves the normal proposal timetable available. An opposing holder's ordinary withdrawal can still be unfinished when a covered proposal is executed.

Easy Track handles defined routine operations, including operator parameter changes, staking-limit adjustments, and grant funding within authorized budgets. Only an address authorized for the relevant motion type can initiate it; those addresses are often committee multisigs.

View image file

The documented Ethereum governance route allows a motion to be enacted after 72 hours if objections remain below 0.5% of total LDO supply. Testnet deployments may use a different duration. Anyone can enact a passed motion, but objections can still reject it after the waiting period while it remains unenacted. Passing the timer and carrying out the authorized operation are separate events.

LDO delegation lets a holder assign voting power while retaining control of the tokens. The holder can override a delegate's vote or revoke delegation. Delegation changes who casts the voting power; the applicable approval and execution conditions remain.

Emergency Track proposals can proceed directly to on-chain voting, skipping the regular forum discussion period and Snapshot vote. A clear rationale must be published before or immediately after the vote starts.

Authorized emergency committees have separate powers to pause designated protocol functions. A withdrawal pause affects both ordinary exits and Rage Quit processing, since Rage Quit uses the same Lido withdrawal queue.